Abstract: My goal in this paper is to investigate the role of the subject in Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology aided by his interpretation of the Kantian categories in "Being Given" and "In Excess". I shall relate Marion's hypothetical saturation of the Kantian categories to the suspension of the I-identity. The inner mechanism of this suspension will be shown to consist in a critical resistance to an excessive intuition that is defined by a failed attempt at the conceptualizing of intuitions. This failure shall manifest the saturated phenomenon as a counter-experience. The critical resistance to an excessive intuition acts as a temporary activity of the subject leading to its role as interpreter inscribed in an infinite hermeneutic. Based on this I argue that Marion's subject is not destroyed by an excessive intuition but is only called upon to investigate a phenomenon from a multitude of perspectives. I hold this to be of the essence for Marion, as it explains the possibility of interpreting and experiencing the given as a given during the encounter with the given in which both the subject as well as the given become manifest. I shall argue thus that the recourse to Kant further clarifies Marion's account of a critical, resistant subject. However, this does not mean that I am arguing for Kant's categories, but that I hold them to have an important explanatory role for Marion's phenomenology.
Introduction
My goal in this paper is to investigate the role of the subject in Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology and to argue for the possibility of a hermeneutic activity aided by Marion's interpretation of the Kantian categories in "Being Given" and "In Excess".1 The subject and its role in interpreting given phenomena has long been the focus of critique concerning Marion's phenomenology. The critics mainly argue that Marion fails to touch on the necessary subject of hermeneutics, or that when he does he simply offers an insufficient account. Jean Greisch2 argues against Marion's "Reduction and Givenness" that givenness presupposes and requires a hermeneutic, i.e., it needs to be interpreted as givenness in order to appear as such. According to Greisch, Marion fails to see this when he argues for a passive subject who merely receives the phenomenon as it gives itself. Jean Grondin3 takes Greisch's account further and-basing himself on Heidegger, Sellars or Derrida -states that the given can only be received within an intentional field, i.e., within the horizon of all possible acts of relating to a given phenomenon. On this account, an interpretational level is implicit and necessary for phenomenology, as it makes both the given and the relating to it possible, since we always experience something as something. Both Grondin and Greisch thus argue for the priority of hermeneutics over givenness and that the former conditions the latter. They both refer to Derrida's argument that the conditions for the possibility of pure givenness are simultaneously the conditions for its impossibility: pure givenness (differance) always withdraws itself and manifests in intentionality as difference, which is made possible by differance. Richard Kearney4 argues in the same vein as he brings the given and revelation in close connection to the context of their manifestation and to language, which shape the way phenomena are experienced. He thus also conditions the given to interpretative requirements. I think that the worries described above are well founded, even though I believe that Marion shows the potential for hermeneutic in "Being Given" -although not fully developed -which he further explains through answers to the above critiques in "In Excess" by introducing the concept of an infinite hermeneutic: the given requires an indefinite number of interpretations. Shane Mackinlay,5 however, finds this account of hermenutics to be distorted and applicable only to already lived phenomena. With recourse to Heidegger he argues that interpretation is always part of experiencing, also during the development of an event. I partly agree with Mackinlay and think that an infinite hermeneutics requires an additional step to account for the experiencing of givenness during the encounter with the given. This shall be explained in this paper as being a conceptual resistance which shows the given as a given. An additional point made by Mackinlay that can also be addressed through the concept of resistance is that too passive a subject leads to the death of the phenomenological subject classically understood as an actively interpreting figure. Lorenz Puntel6 goes a step further and argues that Marion remains within a dualistic phenomenality by simply inverting the subject-object relation, making out of the object a metaphysical authority, which constitutes the subject as a receiver. Puntel's critique shall be addressed in considering the given and the subject as part of the same act of manifestation of givenness and not as dualistic instances. Adam Miller7 reads Marion in a more positive way, saying that he remains within phenomenological immanence by reducing the transcendentals associated with givenness. Miller, nevertheless, also turns against the passivity of Marion's subject, arguing that the subject itself becomes fully suspended and thus -being fully suspended -cannot experience the immanent givenness. According to Marlene Zarader, 8 such an understanding of subjectivity would be incompatible with phenomenology, as the very possibility of manifestation of givenness requires it to give itself over to the conditions of subjective experiencing. Otherwise, givenness would remain potential, since it cannot find any actualisation within the subject and its structures. This brief overview of the critical literature on Marion's understanding of the subject shows that Marion leaves the question of the interpretation of saturated phenomena partly unanswered. I believe that this is due mostly to Marion's vague and at times figurative description of the subject. In "Being Given" and in "In Excess" he talks of the subject as a screen or as a prism, against which and through which givenness can manifest itself and its spectrum. The subject thus acts in these instances as a medium which brings to light through its resistant properties the unseen dimensions of the given. This concept of resistance points to the possibility and necessity of subjective activity, but I think it fails to properly describe said activity. More exactly, it is unclear exactly how resistance makes givenness visible without being a mere inert passive medium of manifestation. In this respect I believe it to be necessary -as Zarader also points out -to investigate the relation between givenness and its manifestation for a subject.
I will try to answer these hermeneutical problems by addressing the problem of saturation from a Kantian standpoint. Jason W. Alvis already recognized Kant's importance for Marion's thinking of subjectivity, when -basing himself on Marion's "Being Given" -he stated that Kant acts as a guiding line in overcoming the transcendental subject and thus as a counter-example that clarifies the objectives of the phenomenology of givenness. Alvis' insight into this matter is that Marion requires the subject to actively work on itself in order to become passive, i.e., the subject must work on itself in order to renounce its constituting activity and reshape its intuition so that it receives itself along with and from the given. This implies for Alvis a struggle against the transcendental status of the subject in order to reach a prolonged state of given-oriented passivity, which coincides with the self-givenness of the given. I believe this is an important insight into understanding the hermeneutics of the given and its afferent reduction.9 I believe further that by taking a closer look at transcendental subjectivity, we can better understand how the subject can reshape its intuition and prepare itself for givenness, given that Marion describes Kant's subject as the "counter-model" of the gifted/ l'adonné and as such an essential part of the determination of the latter.10 In order to show this, I shall connect a hypothetical categorial11 saturation -as it is explained by Marionwith Marion's concept of resistance from "God without Being", "The Banality of Saturation", "In Excess", and "Givenness and Revelation". Building on these two points I shall try to advance a complementary concept of hermeneutics, namely a resistant one. More specifically, I shall first recount Marion's reading of Kant, followed by a short interpretation of transcendental philosophy aiming at showing what a possible saturation of the categories, i.e. fundamental concepts which ground and regulate the formation of all objective phenomena, might imply for the identity of the subject. This is my own interpretation of Kant's categories and their saturation that attempts to show hidden possibilities in Marion's reading of Kant. Thus, even though this paper shall make use of a Kantian language and concepts, I am not seeking to advance a Kantian theory of subjectivity, but merely using transcendental philosophy as a study case. This is meant to show how Marion's subject traverses the path from conceptual transcendentality to recognizing givenness as grounds of phenomenality, i.e., how it can accomplish the reduction from transcendentality to givenness. This section shall relate the saturation of the categories with the suspension of the I-identity. The inner mechanism of this suspension will be shown to consist in a critical resistance to an excessive intuition. Said resistance is defined by a failed attempt at conceptualizing intuitions. This failure manifests the saturated phenomenon as a counter-experience, i.e., as something which opposes objective constitution and manifests itself in this opposition to constitution. The critical resistance to an excessive intuition acts as a temporary activity of the subject leading to its role as interpreter inscribed in an infinite hermeneutic. Based on this it will be argued that Marion's subject is not destroyed by an excessive intuition but is only called upon to investigate a phenomenon from a multitude of perspectives. This shall be then applied to the problematic of the gift, where with a bit of help from Marion's erotic reduction the role of resistance shall become more nuanced: the conceptual resistance shows a lack of representational ability, which calls upon the subject to readjust its position according to the logic of givenness. I hold this to be of essence for Marion as it explains the possibility of interpreting and experiencing the given as a given (against Greisch, Grondin, Kearney, and Zarader) during the encounter with the given (against Mackinlay) in which both the subject as well as the given become manifest (against Puntel). I shall therefore argue that recourse to Kant further clarifies Marion's account of a critical, resistant subject. This however does not mean that I am arguing for Kant's categories, but that I hold them to have an important explanatory role for Marion's phenomenology.
More precisely, I resort to the Kantian categories as I believe that their hypothetical saturation can better explain the process of givenness, an opinion Marion shares, given that he describes his saturated phenomena with the aid of Kant, but does not fully explore. Furthermore, a Kantian translation helps break down the methodical steps of the reduction to givenness and explain in clear terms how the subject would act in Marion's phenomenology, including in the case of possible revelation. More precisely, I shall argue that givenness can only be achieved through a reduction to givenness and that said reduction can be described in Kantian terms as a failed conceptual resistance to the given, i.e., a failed attempt to bring the given under categories that ends up showing the phenomena in their givenness, since this is all that remains when we get rid of all subjective ascriptions. This Kantian approach is grounded by the following: 9 Alvis, "Marion". While Alvis focuses on the intersubjective aspect of the reduction and its actualisation within the erotic phenomenon, I will focus here on a more general account of the reduction to givenness, which is nevertheless compatible with the erotic phenomenon. 10 Marion, "Being Given", 278. 11 Categorial here refers to Kant's categories understood as fundamental concepts of the understanding which regulate all processes of object formation and thus act as conditions of possibility for any possible object or objective phenomena.
First, in "Being Given" and "In Excess," Marion describes his concepts of saturation and givenness through the suspension of the Kantian categories. Second, Marion criticises the priority of the cognizing subject and its transcendental character, and blames it for the devaluation of phenomena as mere objects and thus for the exclusion of certain parts of phenomenality. Third, it is the thesis of this paper that a Kantian reading of Marion can give a clear account of the way in which the constituting and transcendental capacity -and this sort of capacity alone -is suspended when dealing with a special sort of content-rich phenomena, described by Marion as saturated. This suspension can depict the way in which something can be given without a conceptual adequation. Fourth, Marion describes more than just his saturated phenomena according to Kant's categories. He also structures his concept of hermeneutics using Kantian accents: While the saturated phenomena are depicted in a categorial (negative) way, their hermeneutic is enunciated making use of Kant's regulative ideas, i.e., concepts of totality which can find no empirical correspondent in intuition but which nonetheless guide cognition towards systematicity. More precisely, Marion speaks of the experience of the Other as an infinite or endless hermeneutic. This sort of interpretation is described as being similar to Kant's paralogisms, which, although they lead judgments in a regressus ad infinitum, can function as an "als ob" through which the concept of soul may be described as immortal. This concept justifies the possibility of achieving moral (hypothetical) perfection understood as an endless approximation of the respect before the moral law, which in itself is described as a fact of reason. Marion intends to translate this Kantian movement in a phenomenological manner as follows: 1) the moral duty as a fact of reason and the moral law -as self-imposing instances -are not to be found in reason but in the Other. The Other demands from us that we envisage it as the face of the other (Antlitz). This implies that 2) we do not objectify the Other but regard the Other in its endless variety of significations. The aim of this paper is to explain how the subject can traverse this way from transcendental objectifying to an endless hermeneutic of givenness, which would in effect describe the reductive process that stands at the core of Marion's thought. This is reflected in his postulation of the principle of phenomenology as being "so much reduction, so much givenness". As means for this goal I have chosen to explicate Marion's phenomenological description of the endless hermeneutic from a Kantian standpoint. Furthermore, I see subjectivity as playing the key role in understanding the endless hermeneutic and in grounding its plausibility, since the reductive process is in itself first structured by the very thing it tries to overcome. Given that the method of phenomenology is itself influenced by the objectity it means to overcome, it is essential to better understand this objectity in order to illuminate the process and results of its overcoming. In this respect, I shall first analyse Kantian subjectivity and then proceed to build a new concept of hermeneutic out of the saturation of said subjectivity. This will lead to a hermeneutic of resistance which aims to explain the transition from egology to an endless hermeneutic. It is important to note here, that I believe Marion's reference to Kant in "Being Given" is an early clue for the potential of such an interpretational role of the subject. However, I believe that Marion does not exploit his reference to Kant fully, but only uses it as a platform for description of saturated phenomena. This is why Marion's reading of Kant only serves as the starting point for my analysis, from which I will investigate in more detail the potentialities lying behind Marion's reference to Kant's categories -mainly the topics of schematism, object constitution, and subject constitution. Therefore, this paper does not document all of the aspects of Marion's reading of Kant, which Claudia Serban has already done in her detailed analysis.12 Rather, I wish to start from Marion's reading of Kant and build on it with insights from Kantian thought to uncover hidden possibilities for explaining Marion's view of subjectivity. The analysis that follows thus functions as a phenomenological experiment focused on seeing what happens to the transcendental subject when subjected to the challenge of excessive intuitions.
Marion's reading of Kant
In "Being Given," Marion explains that he relates to Kant for two main reasons: first, because Kant recognizes the potential of givenness, even though he fails to further develop it; second, because Kant is one of the main figures of the metaphysics of objectity, i.e. constituting phenomena strictly as objects, given that he subjects all experience to the transcendental conditions of experience embodied by the transcendental subject and its categories as expressions of the unity of apperception, i.e., the ground of all synthesis and representational processes. In "In Excess," Marion speaks of Kant as the proponent of a modern metaphysics that binds ontology to cognition. With this move, actuality is determined by the subjectively determined conditions of possibility, which define the role of philosophy as Scientia prima. Marion argues that this transcendental character of philosophy leads to the birth of egological primacy. In this view the subject acts as the ultimate ground of experience, which is determined in terms of objectity. However, Marion states that the subject cannot act as ultimate ground of reality because it cannot ground two areas of phenomenality: its own individuation and non-objective phenomena. This dual restriction of phenomenality is what for Marion leads to an invu, i.e., that which is not yet seen: "By invu I understand purely and simply what, as a matter of fact, cannot reach or yet reach visibility, even though I could in fact experiment with it as a possible visible."13 The invu is thus not something which cannot manifest itself, but something that has not yet reached visibility or is ignored for objectivity's sake.
Through his reading of Kant and by saturating the categories Marion aims to free phenomenality from the boundaries of pure reason and thus bring said invu to visibility, and to further explain and ground the principle of phenomenology that a phenomenon shows itself insofar as it gives itself. He expounds this as follows: 1) he looks at Kant's categories in the hypothetical case of an excessive intuition; 2) he shows that the categories are unable to grasp such intuitions; 3) based on this incapacity he shows that givenness -and not the subject -ultimately grounds phenomena. On this basis, he can explain his saturated phenomena based on each category. According to quantity, Marion explains that the axioms of intuition fail to explain an excessive intuition: For Kant, these axioms determine the phenomenon as an extensive magnitude, i.e. as a succession of quanta in a quantum. When confronted with a saturated phenomenon the quantitative synthesis cannot arrange the intuitive material into a magnitude, which leads to the failure of the axioms in explaining the phenomenon as predictable quantum. According to quality, the intensive magnitude of a phenomenon is so strong that it cannot be ascribed to a concept and thus remains inconceivable.14 According to relation, saturation consists in an absolute fulfilment: the intuition saturates and exceeds all temporal horizons. Given that time is of essence for the application of categories to sensible content, the intuition can no longer be brought under a concept. Accordingly, saturation is understood as a lived body, where relation is absolute, i.e. cannot be brought in temporal or spatial relations but gives itself immediately. As a result, a saturated phenomenon is not a representation, but received as a pure given. This is defined by Marion as being a flesh or lived body experience, an idea he takes from Michel Henry: "The flesh is to be looked at as a phenomenon whose intuition gives itself in an unexpected way, or more specifically, saturates."15 The flesh is given to me and I find myself to be already given over to the flesh: absolute relation. Through this, the subject also individuates itself. Finally, through the saturation of modality phenomena can no longer be made dependent on the cognizing faculty and give themselves from themselves. This means that the subject no longer determines their possibility nor their logic of manifestation.
Through this hypothetical saturation, Marion aims to show the priority of givenness. His thesis is that a phenomenon can only show itself insofar as it gives itself. The starting point of phenomenality would then 13 Marion, "In Excess", 109. 14 This would seem to agree with Kant's second argument for space as intuition. The argument makes use of the dual understanding of extensive and intensive magnitude within a concept and within intuition. Extension defines the subordination of weaker concepts under more general ones according to genus, species and difference. Intensive magnitude, however, refers to the inclusion of a specified concept within a more general one (see "Idealism") . For intuitions this is inverted: all parts are included within the whole. Because of this, a concept can only be infinite in extension, whilst an intuition only in its intensive magnitude. This may hint at why Marion speaks often of saturated phenomena as intense, violent, powerful phenomena, and not as large, immense phenomena. This would also explain how an intense intuition cannot be fully brought under a certain concept but requires multiple cognitive perspectives. This will be explained in the following sections. 15 Alferi, "Worüber hinaus", 367. German original: "Der Leib ist als ein Phänomen in den Blick zu nehmen, dessen Anschauung sich unvordenklich gibt bzw. sättigt". be set in givenness which addresses a certain receptivity. Within this receptivity the given shows itself as feeling: givenness gives itself to a subject (in the dative) as a received feeling:16 "The receiver, who alone is put in the situation of feeling and impassionate affection, suffers the very flesh of the phenomenon in a state of manifestation."17 Flesh here signifies impenetrability, i.e., the fact that the phenomenon imposes itself without allowing the subject the claim to transcendentality. Without this claim, the phenomenon can only be experienced as given. As such, givenness retains or regains its phenomenal privilege. This goes hand in hand with and is extended by the erotic reduction. This consists in three main characteristics: it makes visible the flesh of the subject as individualised only to it, given that the flesh of the Other is impenetrable; it decentralises and opens up the subject, which is no longer preoccupied with itself but with the Other; and it shows the subject in the situation in which it finds itself already lacking and thus desiring the Other, i.e., in the situation in which it understands itself starting from that which it lacks or from the Other. This desiring subject is then finally individualised by the love for the Other. According to Marion, this radicalises the flesh, i.e., acts as the full actualisation of the subject as l'adonné, given that the subject finds itself already given to its self from another, from that which it lacks, desires and ultimately loves. What can be seen in the erotic reduction is a fight of the subject concerning its own selfhood, a decision to desire the Other and through this decision a renunciation of one's self. The connection between lack, desire and the given shall be further discussed in the last section.
We have seen thus far that the description of givenness as privileged ground of phenomenality starts from a transcendental position, which needs to be overcome, and is guided by a categorial in-determination. As such, Kant may be used as a "guiding thread" for understanding its own overcoming in saturation. Furthermore, I have the conviction that Kant can serve as a guiding thread not only in the via negativa description of saturated phenomena but also in understanding their hermeneutic. For this a closer look at Kant's subject is needed. We have seen that Marion holds the transcendental subject to be the culprit of reducing experience to objectity. This is considered by Marion to be a transcendental egology understood as self-grounding thinking, which in Kant's case would translate into the self-thinking of the subject in its own cognitive acts. Thus, the Kantian subject shall be looked at in the development of its own cognitive process. To this regard, I shall begin by looking at Kant from the standpoint of Dieter Henrich and his reflexivity theory. From this perspective, the following section will analyse Kant's metaphysical and transcendental deduction. The subsequent sections will build on this and look into the possible consequences of saturating the categories.
Kant
According to a conservative reading of Kant, (objective) appearances can only manifest themselves in accordance with the subjective conditions of the cognizing subject. The manifestation of phenomena thus appears to be conditioned by our cognizing faculties. It would follow from this that a phenomenon can only appear as an object of possible experience, because experience itself is governed by the same cognizing faculties. In the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) Kant defines an object as being a representation which stands under concepts. The process of building this relation between representation and concept consists in synthesising the material manifold provided in the forms of intuitions, i.e., in space and time. This synthesising is grounded and determined by the fundamental concepts of the understanding known as the categories of pure understanding, which are grouped by Kant under four titles: quantity (unity, plurality, totality), quality (reality, negation, limitation), relation (subsistence and inherence, causality and dependence, community), and modality (possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency). Kant claims to prove their a priori character in a metaphysical deduction by showing that the categories arise from the form of thinking as rules of joining representations in a judgment. The metaphysical deduction is continued by a transcendental one which aims at showing the universal necessity and applicability of the categories on the objects of experience. This can only be achieved, according to Kant, if the categories determine the rules of synthesis not only in judging but in all levels of synthesising: from the sensible, through the imagination, and into the understanding. Thus, the categories need to apply to all possible and thinkable objects.18 This would reduce possible experience to objectity, as everything that can be cognized relies on the relation between intuition and concepts, i.e. on discursive thought: what is not objectively possible does not appear or appears as nothing for us. However, the latter does not mean for Marion that non-conceptual phenomena are not possible but only that they are not to be understood as objects, although non-objectual phenomena are not to be understood as an unseen or as a withdrawal, either. On the contrary, they are excessive intuitions, which means that there is too much to be seen, so much so that it blinds or overstrains our conceptual scheme, which cannot grasp it in its entirety. Thus, it can also not be fully determined or constituted by the cognizing subject. For Marion this also implies that the phenomenon gives itself from itself and decides upon its own phenomenality.19 As such, an excessive intuition -a saturated phenomenon -can be experienced only as an excess, i.e. only as that which cannot be inscribed within the objective possible experience: "Among the phenomena that I unquestionably experience, paradox [i.e. saturated phenomenon] defines those that happen (like events) only by contra-dicting the conditions of my experience, and therefore that impose themselves only by imposing on me a counter-experience."20 Saturation is experienced as the failure of its conception, as a counter-experience: that which gives itself without any and against subjective determinations. Such a counter-experience does not only evade my constituting gaze, i.e. my determining intentionality, it also forces it to reassess itself and orient itself to the perspective of the phenomenon itself. Marion explains this by making use of the example of a painting that obliges us to position ourselves in the right perspective in order to access its own perspective and see beyond its mere materiality -its colours, oils, canvas and so on. Furthermore, counter-experience can also be understood as a counter-intentionality when the subject finds itself the target of another gaze, i.e., finds itself aimed at by the intentionality of the Other. The intentionality of the Other is experienced solely in its character of addressing the subject, given that the gaze of the Other can provide us with no objective material. This -the encounter of the gazes -not only constitutes the experience of the Other, as gaze evading objective constitution, but also constitutes the addressed subject. I wish to stress here that saturation -be it from a painting or from the Other -manifests itself by opposing the transcendental claim of the subject and by showing it in its limitation. Through this, the opposing phenomenon -the counter-experience -does not show itself as objectively determined, but as that which imposes its own logic of manifestation and, by doing so, decentralizes the I-subject and shows its non-priority in experiencing.
According to this first thesis, saturation is of great (methodological) importance for givenness, as the former brings the latter to light by suspending the cognizing capacities of the subject -which as such also acquire methodological importance. This does not mean, however, that the subject becomes fully passive. Moreover, it means that the subject is stripped of its transcendental capacities: "The ego keeps, indeed, all the privileges of subjectivity, save the transcendental claim to origin."21 The privileges of subjectivity refer here to the identity of the subject and its interpretational activity, without claiming priority over the phenomena which give themselves from themselves and first make possible phenomenal manifestation. As suggested above, Marion's Cartesian and Husserlian method does not aim at destroying the subject, but at regrounding it. The subject may accordingly further synthesise and experience but without having a claim on the origin of phenomenality. I shall attempt a Kantian translation of this reduction for a twofold reason: 1) to better explain -in a non-figurative language -what happens to a subject confronted by an excessive intuition. This is meant to avoid a general critique of phenomenology that it cannot provide a clear cut discourse about givenness, but has to resort to figurative language, thus breaching the boundaries of philosophy;22 2) to see if Marion's usage of Kant's categories is justified and/or fruitful.
Kant states in the Paralogisms that the (thinking) subject must be simple23 and identical to itself.24 The simplicity of the subject refers to its character as absolute unity, which denotes the fact that the subject is void of (empirical) specifity, i.e., it is not divided by subsequent determinations in or under a concept. The identity of the subject relates to the continuity of the same subject in experience. This is an important statement by Kant that points to the difficulty raised by the distinction between the empirical subject, individualized in space and time, and the transcendental subject as original unity of apperception, which makes possible the individualisation of the empirical subject in space and time. This distinction makes it impossible for the transcendental subject to identify itself with that which it first enables, i.e., the empirical subject. More precisely, the subject does not have immediate access to itself, but nevertheless needs to think of itself as unitary and simple in order to account for the continuity of its experience. This continuity can be maintained only if the processes of experience are ascribed to the same representational instance, i.e., the subject. Ascribing the processes of experience to the same subject is possible if these processes are determined by the same set of rules in each instance, i.e., by the categories as expressions of the subjective form of thought, or if the subject is certain of its identity as a sort of facticity. The former position has been used extensively by Dieter Henrich,25 who argues that the identity of the subject can only be attained through a reflexive process of the understanding, which is manifested by the accompanying activity of the "I think".26 Henrich reads Kant's famous "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations"27 as follows: each representation is accompanied by an empirical "I think" which again needs to relate to a unitary I in order to secure the identity of the subject. This means that the subject needs to remain identical to itself in each of its synthesising acts. Said activity can be numerical or moderate (gemäßigt). For Henrich, this means that a subject can transition from one empirical state to another and remain the same, without carrying in itself the entirety of its properties, that is, without being a monad. This transition is made possible by way of synthesis, which is categorially and thus universally determined. The subject remains the same because the categories provide a universally valid system of synthesis. This universal validity also grounds the applicability of the categories. More importantly, the subject remains identical only by relating to the universal system of synthesis provided by the categories. In short: The subject remains the same in each one of its states and in the transition between them because it acts, i.e., synthesises, in the same way in 22 See Brassier, "Nihil Unbound", 28. 23 Kant, KrV, B 407. 24 See Kant, KrV, B 408; see also ibid. B 134, B 135, and A 381. 25 Henrich, "Identität". See also Allison, "Idealism", Powell, "Self-Consciousness", Fricke, "Henrich", and Düsing, "Constitution", 414: "Kant places the analytic unity of apperception behind the synthetic one, for, in his view, only by the synthesis of various representations and their synthetic unity can a consciousness of the identity of the ego within these synthesized representations and thus a thinking self reference of the ego be achieved, or better yet -constituted". Also "The 'I' of the 'I think' is nothing other than the 'consciousness' of the unity of synthesis of a manifold given in sensibility before it is reflected under concepts [das 'denke']. The 'I' is nothing other than the reflexivity of the act of sensible synthesis." Longuenesse, "Capacity", 68. 26 See. KrV A 117: "But it should not go unnoticed that the mere representation I in relation to all others (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is the transcendental consciousness." Also (in relation to KrV B 157): "the act of the 'I think' provides a mere 'Dasein' as an 'I am'. This mere Dasein can be determined only when I appeal to the manifold sensibly given in my inner sense (in the sensible self-intuition)." German original: "Mit dem Actus 'Ich denke' ist ein blosses 'Dasein', ein reines 'dass ich bin', gegeben. Dieses ist in seiner 'Art' nur dann zu bestimmen, wenn ich auf das im inneren Sinn (in der sinnlichen Selbstanschauung) gegebene sinnliche Mannigfaltigkeit zurückgreife' Zobrist, "Subjekt", 156. This does not mean that the transcendental subject can be determined in its actuality. It only means that the empirical subject can be known through its mode of synthesis. Zobrist goes on to say: "the Dasein of the act itself already given before any type of determination proves itself to be a Dasein before any categorial activity, i.e., a Dasein beyond any categorial validity." German original: "Das Dasein des Actus selbst, welches vor jeder 'Art' seiner Bestimmung 'schon gegeben' ist, erweist sich demnach als ein Dasein vor jedem Kategoriengebrauch, als ein Dasein jenseits und ausserhalb der Geltungssphäre der Kategorien." Zobrist, "Subject", 161. More on this in section 5, where the pre-reflexive identity of the subject will be discussed. 27 Kant, KrV, B 131. each one of its states. The subject is identical thanks to the synthetical unity of its apperception expressed categorially. Based on this, Henrich concludes that the categories can be understood in three ways: 1) as the conditions of possibility for objects in general, i.e. the conditions for the possibility of object formation via subsumption under concepts; 2) as conditions for the unity of complex thought; 3) and as conditions for the identity of the subject, i.e. that all representations belong to the one and same subject.
Saturating the categories
Henrich's reading of Kant and the fact that he interprets the identity of the subject as being connected to the categories can shed light on Marion's usage of Kant's categories and uncover further possibilities for understanding saturated phenomena. Marion's reference to Kant implies that the categorial conditions identified by Henrich would be suspended by an excessive intuition, i.e., by saturation: 1) object formation would fail; 2) complex thought would not be unitary; 3) the I-identity of the subject would be disturbed. While points 1 and 2 are addressed by Marion in "Being Given" and "In Excess", point 3 remains unexplored. My Kantian interpretation of Marion thus seeks to expand Marion's reading of Kant in order to include the reference to subjectivity, which can explain how a subject can interpret givenness as givenness. For this I shall look into aspects of transcendental philosophy not yet addressed by Marion and try to understand them within a phenomenology of givenness to further investigate the consequences of Marion's reference to Kant and its potential for a hermeneutic of givenness.
The suspension of the conceptual conditions would allow Marion to argue for the priority of sensibility over the understanding and for a subject which constitutes itself based on affection.28 The subject experiences itself through affection as a "me" and not an "I", as it cannot ascribe the intuition to a unity of synthesis since the conditions for this have been already suspended. When the ascription to a subject becomes suspended then sensations or intuitions constitute themselves as just being given: thanks to the impossibility of bringing intuitions under the analytic unity of apperception -ascribing them to consciousness -sensations are possible only as being given from themselves. On the other side, the subject receives itself as affection, which could explain Marion's concept of flesh: the subject experiences itself as immediately given. This immediate givenness escapes representation and only manifests itself as the receptivity of the subject, which also grounds the reflexive I. It seems that for Marion the reflexive subject is pre-reflexively constituted as a receiver of given sensations. Marion thus attempts to ground the transcendental-reflexive subject in an earlier, more original subject, by saturating its transcendental faculties. This seems to contradict Kant's understanding of the subject as a discursive one: "if I were to take away the thinking subject , the whole corporeal world would have to disappear, as this is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of our subject and one mode of its representations."29 Kant argues strongly for the dependency of intuitions on concepts and the converse, saying that intuitions need to be determined by concepts and concepts need to be specified by intuitions. This holds also for subjectivity, namely, that an empirical subject needs to be determined by a thinking subject, which reaffirms the transcendentalempirical distinction of subjectivity made in the beginning. Countering this type of subjectivity is exactly what Marion intends to do. A closer look proves helpful. Marion does not deny the thinking subject but only its transcendental claim on phenomenality; by contradicting this claim he attempts to re-ground the subject in a pre-discursive one in which the discursive opposition between feeling and thinking does not split the subject into an empirical and transcendental one, and in which the subject may and can relate to itself without reflexivity. This seems to be a possibility of understanding subjectivity that even Kant does not reject in his later writings. Even though in the "Anthropology" he again stresses that personhood -that is, the subject as a continuous and unitary expression of itself -is dependent on identifying oneself as an I, Kant also speaks of a state of consciousness which precedes the I and does not depend on reflexivity:
But it is noteworthy that the child who can already speak fluently nevertheless first begins to talk by means of 'I' fairly late (perhaps a year later); in the meantime, speaking of himself in the third person (Karl wants to eat, walk, etc.). When he starts to speak by means of 'I' a light seems to dawn on him, as it were, and from that day on he never again returns to his former way of speaking. -But before he merely felt himself, now he thinks himself.30
It seems that Kant in his "Anthropology" acknowledges several stages of subjectivity, the first being a selffeeling subject. The subject feels itself, i.e., relates to itself non-conceptually, before being able to think itself. This self-feeling should not, however, be understood as an intellectual self-intuiting, which would reveal the subject in its own essence. 31 Moreover, Kant only intends to show here that the subject is itself already given as facticity, even though it cannot yet think itself. Therefore, it would seem that the selfthinking of the subject is something acquired and is preceded by a more naïve self-feeling. It would follow from this that Marion's philosophy shows the subject in its pre-transcendental state, which for Marion is the authentic subject. It will be further shown that the earlier passive subject does not get absorbed into the later transcendental and reflexive one. It will be argued that the former enables the latter to experience in a synthesising manner. This will prove to be of essence for my reading of Marion. In section 5 and 6 the way in which the subject can pass over from a transcendental state to a passive perspective will be articulated. More specifically, I will argue that this alteration is made possible by an active resistance of the subject to the given, a resistance that can only be understood as a cognitive resistance, which fails over and over again to show the priority of givenness in the given.
Hermeneutics of resistance
Up to this point, I have depicted a transcendental subject confronted with an inability to constitute phenomena due to their rich content, described by Marion as saturated. This has been related to Henrich's reading of Kant's subject as a self-thinking reflexive instance. This combination has allowed me thus far to give a Kantian explanation of Marion's reduction and suspension of the transcendental subject and its re-grounding in a passive one. Even though this has provided a clearer account of the possibility of a subject constituted as a receiver we may still be confronted with the initial problem of having too passive a subject. I address that concern here. As explained earlier, the saturation manifests itself as a failure of the representing capacities. This consists in the attempt to signify intuitional material via concepts and the consequent failure to do so due to the intensity of the intuitional material, which requires multiple aimings at the same given from multiple perspectives. Three things are of great importance here. First, even though the conceptual signifying fails, the subject is still in relation to a given or, better, the given is still manifest to the subject. The second point follows, namely that precisely because the conceptual signifying fails the only thing that remains manifest is the given as given. Third, the failure of said faculties also implies that they were at work trying to represent something, which obviously points to a certain activity of the subject. I believe that Marion gives a clear representation of this activity in "The Banality of Saturation". Here the counter-experience is described as the failure of the attempt to objectify the phenomenon. This attempt turns the intentionality of the subject into the very object of said intentionality: the failure of objectifying becomes the aim of intentionality and hints at the impossibility of objectual constitution, which in turn brings to light the "limitation of the objectual constitution".32 Following this self-intentional process the subject becomes disappointed as it tries to further conceptualise the phenomenon by inscribing it in a concept other than the initial one. The disappointment arises as it becomes obvious for the subject that the second concept cannot give an adequate account of the phenomenon. This leads to a disruption of sensible perception carried over by the excess of the intuition, which is classified by Marion as resistance (to conceptualisation). In my reading, 30 Kant, "Anthropology", 7:127. 31 Even though this concept of absolute intuition is present in Kant's "stillem Jahrzenten". Here, in contrast to the KrV, Kant argues that we can absolutely intuit ourselves (and nothing else), which would mean we would have access to our metaphysical essence. See Zobrist, "Subjekt", 25. 32 Diekhans, "Das saturierte", 288. This self-investigation of the subject is what Marion calls "alteration". this parallels the path from intentionality to counter-intentionality discussed by Marion in "God without Being". Here, counter-intentionality is achieved by traversing several states: starting from a state of pure criticism where the subject experiences nothingness, then going through boredom which expresses the pure lack of interest for being. This boredom, stretching into infinity, becomes melancholy in which the subject experiences a resistance from without manifested as counter-intentionality.
According to these considerations from "The Banality of Saturation" and "God without Being", I hold it to be plausible that -in a Kantian translation -saturation can appear as such through the failure of the categories confronted with an opposition to conceptualisation. Following this failure, the subject receives itself as receptivity, which has only the experience of something, which resists its faculties. However, as we have seen, the subject also resists the excess of intuition by attempting and simultaneously failing to represent it. The resistance of the subject consists in attempting to represent via concepts that which is given to it. The resistance of the given consists in its excessiveness. The encounter between this conceptual resistance of the subject and the opposing excessiveness of the given forces the subject to become conscious of its own failure, which allows the subject to see itself as affected by the given without representing it. This then allows the subject to interpret itself as affectivity and the given as given. Thus, it exercises a hermeneutics of resistance, which consists mainly in the interaction between the resistance of the given and that of the subject:33 where the subject experiences that the resistance of the given is greater as its own -as its attempt at representing it -it renounces its representational identity and gives itself over to givenness by recognizing the given as a given due to the inability of predication: "L'adonné does not compromise the reduction to the given but rather confirms it in transferring the self from itself to the phenomenon."34 In order for the subject to give itself over -and not just be hijacked by givenness -it is necessary that it traverse the path from representational identity to failed attempt, which makes the interaction between resistances visible: this would be nothing else than the reduction to givenness explained in Kantian language. Said (reductional) path requires an active passivity which does not constitute. It recognizes moreover the resistance of intuition through the failure of its own representational resistance and, based on this, recognizes the given not as an object -because it cannot do so without conceptualising it -but as a given -because even though not represented it is still given.
How does this relate to the problem of a reversal of the subject-object-relation?35 When the resistant subject concedes and recognizes the intuitional resistance, it does not cease to exist, just as the phenomenal resistance is not constituted by it being recognized by the subject. The subject and the phenomenal resistance merge and grow together as the act of givenness. They are both constituted as folds of the act of the given. This reading would also find support in Marion's "Givenness and Revelation", where the subject can experience revelation as authentic only if it resists it.36 Further support is found in "In Excess", where Marion again points to the concept of resistance as place for the manifesting of the given, which shows itself in the subject described as a screen that captures the given or against which the given becomes visible. This suggests that the difference between passivity and activity is no longer valid. The subject receives the given through the agency of its capacitas -in its pre-modern sense as capacity to receive: "Reception implies, indeed, passive receptivity, but it also demands active capacity, because capacity (capacitas), in order to increase to the measure of the given and to make sure it happens, must be put to work-work of the given to receive, work on itself in order to receive."37 This shows that the subject is active for the sake of being passive, which would describe the subject in a paradoxical way, just like the saturated phenomenon. More importantly, this reading avoids the danger of absolute surrender, of accepting a given as an absolute 33 This will become clearer in the last section. 34 Marion, "In Excess", 48. 35 "As Janicaud has observed, the problem is that to reverse the subject is obviously not at all to suppress it, but, quite to the contrary, to maintain it. One can vary as one pleases the characteristics attributed to the subject (by privileging its beingaffected rather than its active being, for example), yet its function (which is to allow the appearing of phenomena) remains unchanged. However, if this function remains unchanged, it means that the character of subjectivity is maintained throughout, and that the promised dispossession or dismissal has not taken place." Zarader, "Phenomenality and Transcendence", 115. 36 See Marion, "Givenness", 2, and Sandru, "Review". 37 Marion, "In Excess", 48.
authority, which could lead to political extremism, religious fanatism, psychological drama, and/or dogmatism.38 Contrary to such a danger, reducing phenomenality to givenness by means of resistanceas described above -only reveals the multitude of significations required by a given and not its absolute status. This multitude of significations requires, further, that the subject adjust itself to it by accepting a multitude of possible intentional perspectives. This respects the critique of the idol from Marion's earlier works. In "God without Being" the idol is understood as the process through which the subject is blinded by an object and takes it to be absolute, instead of understanding it as an icon, i.e., as a reference to givenness. Thus, the given requires that it not be taken as an absolute, but that it be interpreted in an endless process of interpretation and of reducing it to its givenness. I examine this point in the next section.
From resistance to infinite hermeneutics
One question thus remains open, namely, what happens after the subject first resists the excessive intuition and how does this connect to the infinite hermeneutic? Marion states that we may resist the initial shock of a saturating intuition by going through an endless process of signification: "I can only pursue them [the endless meanings of a saturated phenomenon] by unceasingly multiplied and modified significations, in a hermeneutic without end."39 Resorting once more to Kant, the goal of this section is to explain how the subject, through a resistant hermeneutics, makes the switch from the initial shock of saturation to the endless process of signification, i.e. to an endless hermeneutic. In Marion's view, Kant provides a clue for this with his concept of the sublime, which describes a subject in wonder when faced with quantities or forces which cannot be properly synthesised: "Just as in the case of the Kantian sublime, the resistance of the divine to disclosure becomes in itself the core of the iconic donation, which thus can only work negatively by hinting at what it does not show."40 With Kant, the subject does not cave in front of an excessive intuition but sees its own reason as superior through it. Thus, the subject keeps on identifying itself as unitary due to a return to reflexivity after a first moment of wonder. Marion says that by doing this Kant misses the opportunity of givenness. However, I think that the Kantian moment of trying to return to reflexivity is a major part of the infinite hermeneutics. Indeed, Christina Gschwandtner41 points out the necessity of the possibility of a cognitive investigation of saturated phenomena in order to retain a certain plausibility of Marion's phenomenology. She argues that it must be possible for the subject to understand a saturated phenomenon (even though not fully) either by studying it for a long time or by sharing the burden of researching it in a community. This is of course compatible with Marion's infinite hermeneutics. This chapter aims at connecting resistance with the infinite hermeneutics and explaining how the latter can serve as a critical perspective on phenomenality and not simply as a continuous (perhaps traumatic) experiencing of an excess.
In order to achieve this, I shall try to explain in detail how the subject is determined by an initial saturating affection and a first moment of resistance. This will be made with recourse to my initial reading of Kant through Henrich, who argues that Kant's account of consciousness is a reflexive identity of the subject that is rooted in the idealistic tradition.42 Henrich criticizes this conception by arguing that Kant's account is circular. More precisely, if one understands consciousness as reflexive it must also be thought of as an intellectual act. This act, however, presupposes a unitary thinking subject. Accordingly, the reflexive theory of consciousness equates the reflexive consciousness with the already presupposed thinking and unitary I, which would be a paradox.43 Henrich goes on to say that Fichte found a way out of such paradoxical circularity by developing a self-positing subject. Sturma, however, thinks that Kant never argued for a reflexive consciousness. He differentiates between self-referral as explicit self-consciousness 38 See again Marion, "Givenness", 2. 39 Marion, "In Excess", 112. This is especially the case for event-like phenomena, but holds for all saturated phenomena. 40 Han, "Transcendence", 124. 41 Gschwandtner, "Degrees". 42 Henrich, "Fichtes". 43 See also Sturma, "Kant", 112. and a pre-reflexive one to be understood as an immediate certainty of existence. The latter is thus not objective knowledge but represents a pre-reflexive I: "Kant describes the explicit self-relation or the reflected consciousness of the subject not as an "inward reflection," but as a state of awareness, as an 'attentio'."44 Sturma thus sees Kant's consciousness not as constituted by a reflective act but as consisting in an immediate self-relation, i.e., as an "attentio" to its pre-reflexive facticity. Ameriks45 agrees with Sturma and thinks that Henrich's reflexive theory -that the Kantian subject can be self-conscious only by reflecting its empirical subject understood as object -is superfluous. He argues that Kant speaks of a primitive self-referentiality that is always present in experience even though not on a cognitive level. Ameriks expounds further that a sort of Fichtean self-positing is also present in Kant's philosophy. Sturma agrees with this but also explains that Kant differentiates himself from Fichte given that he understands the self-positing as a non-conceptual facticity of consciousness and not as an intellectual intuition, which is reminiscent of the quotation from the "Anthropology" regarding the self-feeling subject. Here, Kant points to the possibility of a pre-reflexive relation to oneself manifested as feeling. This facticity is characterised by that "which according to Kant remains necessarily recognizable after all abstractions have been made, i.e., the relation to the fact of experience."46 The facticity describes not the spatio-temporal subject but rather a transcendental one that posits the reflexive I in space and time. Friedrich Kaulbauch argues along the same lines in describing the Kantian subject as consisting originally (pre-reflexively) in a commitment to the world (Real-or Weltbezug) . This first enables a reflexive activity: "the I think becomes aware of itself primarily as an acting subject in a real world: its theoretical activity is to be understood as a special form of its original consciousness of its commitment to the real."47 The transcendental subject remains for Kant non-conceptual and non-cognizable. The understanding through concepts of such a subject would be an infinite task of its reflexivity.
Given these considerations, I now rephrase my initial findings. The reflexive subject and only this subject is suspended through the saturation of the categories. More precisely, the intentional constituting subject is set aside, and the facticity of its consciousness is made visible as an implicit commitment to the world (Weltbezug). How would this relate to Marion's l'adonné? I wish first to highlight two things concerning the Kantian subject. These two points shall lead to a conclusion: 1) Sturma and Ameriks see Kant's subject as similar to Fichte's, given that Kant also allows for a pre-reflexive consciousness. This can be understood as a self-positing which means that the subject is self-conscious without projecting itself in something exterior to itself. It is more that the subject feels itself as self-relation; 2) A self-positing implies that the consciousness of the subject springs out from its spontaneity. These two points, as I said, lead to a conclusion as they allude to Marion's concept of flesh. He understands this as an absolute relation. This would mean that the subject experiences the flesh as self-affection due to immediacy. Through this the flesh is always thought as mine, which also shapes the individuality of the subject. At the same time, the flesh also gives the subject its self as it determines it as facticity. Accordingly, the flesh is described by Marion as the first phenomenon of the world that also posits the subject in phenomenality and structures the latter: "all phenomenalization of the world for me passes through my flesh. Without it, the world would disappear for me."48 Marion's thinking of the flesh as self-affection is inspired by Henry. Both start from the critique that transcendental philosophy splits the subject in two incompatible parts, a transcendental and an empirical one. This distinction occurs given that the transcendental subject, understood as the grounds of intuition, cannot be given itself in intuition and thus cannot be cognized other than as an object, i.e., as an empirical subject. This points to the limitations of transcendental philosophy and the necessity of re-grounding 44 Sturma, "Kant", 114. German original: "Entsprechend jener bereits angeführten Argumentationsperspektive beschreibt Kant ein explizites Selbstverhältnis bzw. einen reflektierten Bewußtseinszustand nicht als ein ‚In-sich-zurückwenden', sondern als einen Aufmerksamkeitszustand, als eine ‚attentio'". 45 Ameriks, "Kant and the Self". 46 Sturma, "Kant", 122. German original: "was nach Kant bei allen Abstraktionen immer noch erkennbar sein muß, nämlich der Bezug zum Faktum der Erfahrung". 47 Kaulbach, "Philosophie", 69. German original: "Ich-denke wird sich zuerst als in der realen Welt handelndes Subjekt bewußt: theoretisches Verhalten ist als besondere Form des seines ursprünglichen Realbezuges bewußten Ich anzusehen". 48 Marion, "In Excess", 89.
the subject in a more originary subjectivity, which precedes the distinction between transcendental and empirical. Both Marion and Henry49 see this originary subjectivity as being self-affection. However, here is where they also part ways. Whilst Henry sees in self-affection -understood as self-referentiality -the place where givenness originates, Marion says that the flesh itself is a mode of givenness, namely, an immediate givenness: the subject finds its self as already given to itself, which first enables self-referentiality. In this way, Marion can address Henry's worry that pure givenness is impossible given that it is first grounded and thus mediated by self-affection. Furthermore, 1) by inverting this grounding relation between givenness and self-affection, 2) by describing self-affection as self-giving, and 3) by considering that self-affection is thought as the first phenomenon of the world, Marion can argue for the primacy of givenness in experience: given that self-affection is the first phenomenon of the world, it also structures the way we are or relate to the world, namely, in the mode of givenness. This would also explain how the Kantian subject reveals itself as facticity, i.e., as already given to itself, in direct commitment to the world (the given), i.e., as an 'attentio' committed to itself and the given. As such, the subject can be thought of as a passive spontaneity, which would hint at a possible solution to Henry's critique of Kant50 that he failed to develop a proper subjectivity, given that he does not account for the passivity and the proper being of the subject. Understood as "attentio," Kant's subject can also be understood as a responsive affectivity or as passive spontaneity, where the ability to receive grounds the subjective implication in phenomenality. This could answer Henry's critique, given that the subject as "attentio" addresses the two requirements of subjectivity, which Henry says Kant does not account for and which would be necessary for a subjectivity proper: 1) as facticity the subject is immediately conscious of itself and 2) it contains its self already given within itself, even though not as an I but as l'adonné.51 More importantly, the Kantian subject understood as facticity only reinforces what Marion says about the transcendental consciousness: that it is already there, it is already given before the subject finds itself conscious, which becomes all the more apparent in the erotic phenomenon where the subject finds itself as "being loved and named as one who 'loves first'."52 This Kantian description can be re-translated in Marion's phenomenology, then, as a receiver which constitutes itself as commitment starting from the given.53 Furthermore, this implies that the subject understands itself as self-affection or commitment only since it first constitutes itself as given to itself, i.e., as it is first shaped by givenness. This brings to light the Kantian possibilities of understanding subjectivity as well as its limitations, i.e., the need for synthetic knowledge and the exclusion of phenomena intuited in other ways, as described by Marion and Henry.
Based on the above, I argue that had Marion also considered the categorial implications for subjectivity in Kant, he could have provided a clearer account of his own understanding of subjectivity. Accordingly, had Marion also considered the Kantian reflexive subject in his saturation of the categories, he could have made clear how the theoretical-reflexive subject is grounded by a more original understanding of the subject, which can behave other than as merely active and intentional and which presupposes an already given flesh: "In short, before the cogito exists, the ego would be well and truly already established in its unconditioned existence as corpus et sensus. The feeling body would be anterior and not posterior to the cogitatio."54 A phenomenological example for such an experience of subjectivity is provided, I argue, based on Marion, by the saturation of the categories. This shows how an excessive intuition can revert the subject to its pre-reflexive state as a feeling body. The saturated phenomenon brings this subject as l'adonné to light. This does not mean, however, that the reflexive subject "dies" in case of a saturation, but that it returns to a more original determination, that of l'adonné. From here it can decide how to return to the given. This accords with Marion's "call of givenness" problematic, according to which the subject is not forced to accept givenness, but can choose to ignore it. However, if it does not ignore it, it can still return to the given in a reflexive manner and the character of the given decides the form of its hermeneutics. When dealing with common phenomena the hermeneutics will remain classical. When dealing with a saturated phenomenon, it shall run in an infinite movement. This sort of interpretation is described by Marion in "In Excess" where he also speaks of the goal of his phenomenology:
to consider phenomena where the duality between intention (signification) and intuition (fulfilment) certainly remains, as well as the noetic-noematic correlation, but where, to the contrary of poor and common phenomena, intuition gives (itself) in exceeding what the concept (signification, intentionality, aim, and so on) can foresee of it and show. I call these saturated phenomena, or paradoxes.55
Saturated phenomena are thus not to be thought as beyond the reflexive activity of the subject. They just overstrain the subject as they give themselves as a multitude of perspectives that cannot be synthesised at once in a unity. They cannot be fully categorially determined. This means that they cannot be schematised, which further implies that the excessive intuition is not being reduced to a single objective perspective: "a schema represents a concept concerning one aspect of a given phenomenon [:] Schema(Category(Perception)."56 This quote explains how the categorial determination of phenomena is mediated by a certain categorial schema, which determines the phenomenon under one aspect of said category. This is exactly how Marion describes the invu, namely, as an object determined under one aspect and excluding others. The excluded aspects are what constitutes the invu. The saturated phenomena however do not accept this oneaspect determination, but require multiple perspectives. Based on this we can better define the infinite hermeneutics: Saturation initiates a resistant hermeneutics that recognizes the multitude of perspectives and through this also the failure of the categories. This in turn asks for another perspectival determination, which shall also fail and require further aimings from new perspectives. Saturation thus initiates a selfreiterating resistant hermeneutics which -as unitary process -represents the infinite hermeneutics. I wish to further explain this through the categorial formula provided above:
This equation explains infinite hermeneutics as the (failed) sum of schematisations of the same intuition under a category -without requiring the completion of the subsumption of the intuition under the category: "It must be allowed, then [in the case of saturation], to overflow with many meanings, or an infinity of meanings, each equally legitimate and rigorous, without managing either to unify them or to organize them."57 At this point, one might ask why the infinite hermeneutics is here described as a sum and not as a mathematically more suitable limes formula. I think that saturation is not an exponentially growing movement of approaching a limit and never achieving it. Such an experience would be easily described as an appresentational idealisation of phenomena.58 However, saturation does not present itself as an absence, which only gives itself in thought, but as fully given, as a fait accompli. Saturation is already given as the sum of all its components and possible intentional perspectives, as Marion explains when speaking of paintings as saturated phenomena: "it exposes itself as the potential sum of all that which all have seen, see, and will 55 Marion, "In Excess", 112. 56 Berg, "Kategorien", 89. German original: "ein Schema bildet einen Begriff auf einen Aspekt eines Phänomens ab[:] Schema(Kategorie(Wahrnehmung)". 57 Marion, "In Excess", 111. 58 See: "we can infinitely extend in our mind a series of numbers created by successive bisection of the respectively attained numbers -1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, etc. -and then pretend that it will eventually come to an end, that is, that it will at some point reach the limit -limes -on which it is closing in. Because our mathematical consciousness can never reach that limit…it is impossible that it could be intuitionally given to consciousness in this way, as could, for example, the values ½ or ¼. Despite this nonintuitiveness, however, the assumption of the limit is reasonable because we did nothing but imagine the series as having been 'run through to the end' in strict accordance with the law of its creation, as Husserl says in Supplement II to the Crisis". Held, "Phenomenology", 332. see there."59 Thanks to this multitude of inherent perspectives, saturation requires a hermeneutic -initially a resistant one which shows the given as given and requires multiple interpretations -and does not exclude it. The fact that the hermeneutic finds no end only serves to show the saturated character of a phenomenon: "the 'without end' attests that the event happened starting from itself, that its phenomenality rose up from the self of its givenness."60 And this holds more so for the possible phenomenon of revelation which would act as the saturation of all horizons.61
Now that we have the formula for saturation based on transcendental philosophy the other phenomena can also be explained through its agency: 1 Weak phenomena: � = Schema n (Category(Perception) n=1 "The less the object calls for lived experiences, the more easily intention can find its confirmation, and the more continuously it can repeat its aim in an object which from that point is quasi-subsistent."62
where x<∞: "It is the same for common phenomena, objects constituted in the sensible world: in the majority of cases, intuition remains within intention."63 Saturation thus does not lead to the death of the subject but shows the origins of subjectivity. In this context I have shown the inner workings of the reduction at work in showing said origin as a transition from a transcendental standpoint through a repeated interpretational resistance leading to an endless signification. This process of reduction shall now be further specified by making use of three concrete examples provided by Marion. They concern the possibility of the gift through the suspension of the subject, the receiver and the material gift.
Three reductions
Marion begins "Being Given" by discussing, against Derrida and Mauss, how a pure gift (alluding to the possibility of revelation as well) can be possible without being inscribed in economical restraints. He argues that a pure gift is possible only when the economical transcendentals -a) the givee, b) the giver, and c) the material given -are suspended. I believe the saturation of the categories can provide a more detailed description of these suspensions and can also explain a further one, namely, d) the suspension of possession. a) First, given that the reflexive I-identity is dependent on the categories, their saturation also suspends this I-identity. This would then mean that the I can no longer identify itself as a unitary and synthesising subject but only as one who receives the phenomenon as a complete synthesis, as a fait accompli. This would then imply that the subject is not prior to givenness but receives itself from it and from the giving-process as receptivity. As constituted within the act of giving, the subject no longer acts as a receiver standing in economic relations to a giver or a given. b) A second consequence of the saturation of the categories is that these could not be applied to the sensible. This hindrance would then also imply that the given cannot be inscribed by the subject in causal relations, which would also result in the incapacity of ascribing a giver to the given. c) The given then appears as just that, as a pure given. d) A similar consequence of the saturation would be that the given cannot be constituted as a representation and thus escapes objectivity and objectity. It would moreover appear as a feeling -in Kantian termsindependent of its materiality. This stands in close connection to the fourth consequence, that the gift cannot be appropriated by the subject. The synthesizing I -represented by the "I think" -is, as shown above, responsible for representing givens as objects. The "I think" functions for Kant in a twofold way. It first acts as the analytic unity of apperception that must be able to include all my representations as they are reflected and banded through concepts. This unity however presupposes a second, synthetical one, which acts as the condition for the possibility of thinking the analytical unity: the analytical unity can be thought only mediated by the synthetical unity as the identity of all my synthetical acts. 64 This bases itself on the fact that each synthetical act must belong to a unitary I in order for the analytical unity to include all synthesised representations. Only based on this, can representations be identified as mine.65 I think these characteristics of Kantian subjective reflexivity could be of major importance for Marion's project. Placed in the scenario of an excessive intuition they could better explain the role of the subject as a hermeneutical active receiver. More precisely, it could explain how an infinite hermeneutics functions: it brings the synthetical act in an infinite process which allows us to experience the phenomenon but never as (fully) mine. More precisely, I can experience the phenomenon because it gives itself as a fait accompli, as already synthesised, but without the claim for possession, as I cannot fully bring it under concepts and thus cannot fully bring it within the analytical unity and call it my own. The understanding is rather forced to attempt an endless synthesis, i.e., an endless resistance, of it from a multitude of perspectives in order to make sense of it. Accordingly, I can experience the phenomenon as something given to me, which can never fully belong to me. The lack of possession is an important step in completing the resistance and the reduction to givenness. Lack is discussed by Marion in "The Erotic Phenomenon" and is defined -paradoxically -as that which is most intimately mine. Possession on the other hand is thought of as something exterior, something which I can exchange and thus as strictly objective and economical. The fact that I lack the capability of making phenomena mine does not then mean that they remain exterior to me in a dualistic way, but more paradoxically that they relate to me more intimately and that I understand myself starting from this lack. More importantly, this lack induces me to work on myself in order to attain this intimate relation with the given, which is completed logically in the encounter of my flesh with the flesh of the Other or in love. Here the parallel to the erotic reduction is again visible. While the lack of representational abilities induces the subject to adjust itself to the given, the lack of the Other induces the subject to desire and finally decide itself for the other.66 Thus, the unattainability of the given and the Other -made visible in my reading by the failure of conceptualisation -determines the subject to work on itself and open up to the logic of givenness, which would require an infinite interpretational interaction with the given and the Other. Accordingly, the conceptual resistance and its subsequent failure is what determines the subject to decide itself for the interpretation of the given as given, i.e., to answer the call of givenness.
I resort to one of Marion's examples to make this clearer, namely, war. Although in time a war can be better understood through a detailed analysis of its economical, historical, political dimensions, to name just a few, its non-factual dimensions remain unexhausted. This would again be compatible with Kant and the multitude of unconscious representations: "According to Kant we certainly have many representations of which we are not conscious; among our conscious representations there are some we just apprehend without reproducing them or reproduce without subjecting them to the rules of synthesis that allow them to be reflected under concepts -that is, to be thought."67 Of course, the unconscious representations are not problematic for Kant; they can simply be brought to thought. I argue that Marion aims exactly at bringing to light those aspects of phenomenality that are usually not thought. A saturated phenomenon can be given -just as unconscious representations -even though it is not thought. These kinds of phenomena (in their Kantian translation) would then consist -due to their excessive content -in an infinite attempt at bringing them under the analytical unity, that is, in an endlessly repeated conceptual resistance whose failure forces the subject to adapt itself to the given and adopt new perspectives in experiencing it.
64 See Longuennesse, "Capacity", 67. 65 Ibid. 66 For a more detailed analysis of the concepts of "lack", "desire", and "love" within the erotic reduction see Alvis, "Marion". 67 Longuennesse, "Capacity", 66.
Marion's concept of resistance
Up to this point, I have tried to expound a Kantian translation of how the subject confronted with an overly intense intuition may act, in order to make sense of Marion's reference to Kant and his often sporadic and figurative descriptions of the subject. I have shown that the subject first resists said intuition by trying to conceptualize the given. The failure of this resistance makes the given and its multitude of significations manifest and challenges the subject to renounce the transcendental position it assumes, i.e., to answer the call of givenness. This description was meant to better explain the reductional process to givenness proposed by Marion. He claims that the result of the reduction is that givenness should be found at the beginning and at the end of phenomenality. This motivates him to formulate his own principle of phenomenology: so much reduction, so much givenness. Said reduction frees the given from the metaphysical limitations imposed on it by the principle of sufficient cause and the principle of non-contradiction. Marion sees phenomenology as apt to achieve this disenthralment of the given. Accordingly, he resorts to the principles of phenomenology, but also thinks that these are in need of revision, especially the reduction. He feels that Husserl's and Heidegger's reductions were still shaped by a form of subjectivism. This is why he argues for the above mentioned principle of phenomenology -so much reduction, so much givenness -which requires that the subject reduce itself as well, in order to become the medium for the manifestation of the given and let the given manifest itself from itself: "Consciousness becomes the screen upon which given phenomena show themselves instead of the origin and measure of objective thought." 68 However, the following questions were raised in this paper: How exactly can a subject act as a screen and in what consists its hermeneutic role in the phenomenology of givenness? When the subject is the screen, i.e., the medium of the manifestation of the given, is the given not simply understood from a subjective standpoint? If this is the case, can Marion avoid a subjectively constituted manifestation of the given -in the transcendental sense? As pointed out above, Marion recognizes this danger and that the reduction always needs to be applied to the subject too: "if all reduction demands an operator who brings back the semblance of the appearing to the full appearing of phenomena, this operator him-or herself is found modified -and essentially -by the reduction that he or she puts to work."69 Marion argues that the subject is altered or modified within reduction in a twofold manner: a) the subject renounces the claim to transcendentality and acknowledges the self of the phenomenon; b) given that the subject renounces its transcendentality, it also annuls the difference between the empirical and the transcendental self, which now constitutes itself as receptivity. This does not mean that the transcendental becomes the empirical, but simply that this distinction is no longer at work. Marion explains further that the receptivity of the subject implies an activity of the subject, given that receiving the given is what brings both subject and object to manifestation. Said manifestation is described by Marion in terms of resistance, given that the subject acts as the screen against which the given manifests itself. The same function of the subject is explained through another example, namely, that of a prism. The prism can focus the entire spectrum of light and make it visible simply by resisting it: "Resistance -a function proper to l'adonné -becomes the index of the transmutation from what gives itself into what shows itself."70 In this resistant interaction both the given as well as the subject are made visible. The latter manifests itself in the reduction of itself to resistant receptivity to the given.
The goal of this paper was to investigate the transformation of the subject into a screen for givenness. Given that the two aspects of subjectivity mentioned above that are suspended in the reduction are related to transcendentality, I found it very relevant to investigate how a subject can renounce its transcendentality and accept receptivity. For this to become clear I resorted to transcendental philosophy and confronted it, following Marion's example, with a saturating phenomenon. Following this guiding thread I have been able to explain how a possible saturating intuition would be met by the transcendental subject with: 1) an initial conceptual resistance, 2) which would fail given the intensity of the intuition; 3) this would stop the subject from assuming a transcendental position, 4) considering that it cannot subsume the intuition under the 68 Marion, "Being Given", xi. 69 Ibid., 46. 70 Ibid., 50.
categories of the understanding as necessary and constituting conditions of experience, 5) and considering that the subject can only experience the given by resisting it without exhausting it in predicates; the subject thus makes visible that which was already given and in doing so also does not claim priority over the given; 6) in this sense, the conceptual resistance to the given makes it apparent as a given in its multitude of meanings, 7) which requires that the subject interpret the given in an endless movement of resistance; 8) this also reassesses the subject as grounded in a pre-reflexive receptive structure, 9) which annuls the difference between the empirical and the transcendental subject, 10) given that the subject is given to itself immediately as flesh. These ten points hopefully accord with Marion's objectives in overcoming transcendentality. Points 1) -6) would as such explain objective a) and point 7) -10) would explain objective b). Moreover, the resistant hermeneutic becomes apparent in point 6) as the interpretation of the given as given in the absence of representational capacities: confronted with the failure of its own representational capacities, the subject acknowledges and interprets the given as given. This has been further developed by applying the hermeneutic of resistance -in its Kantian translation -to the problematic of the gift. This phenomenological experiment concluded that the suspension of the economical dimensions of the gift -the giver, the givee, the gift -can be explained through resistance. The analysis has also shown how possession is suspended in favour of a lack of representation, which determines the subject to work on itself in order to recognize the given as given and thus to answer the call of givenness. This has been made in connection to the erotic reduction which thus further shapes and clarifies the function of resistance in the phenomenology of givenness.
It is furthermore important to note here that even though these 10 points were deduced from the confrontation between transcendental philosophy and a saturated phenomenon, they do not remain within transcendental philosophy. They only explain how the reduction from transcendentality to givenness might work and in doing so also explain the process through which the subject can experience a pure given. In my view, this reference to Kant's transcendental philosophy has not been fully explored by Marion, even though he makes use of it -as inspiration but mainly as a descriptive counter-example. In my opinion he only uses Kant to describe certain traits of saturated phenomena, but does not fully recognize the potential of explaining the role of the subject by saturating it in a Kantian context. By not taking advantage of this opportunity he ends up describing the subject and its resistance in figurative terms such as "screen" and/or "prism". I believe that by not detailing the resistance of the subject in its function as a screen and/or prism, Marion also neglects a description of the activity and hermeneutic of the subject. Here is where I think Marion's reference to Kant proves itself relevant: it can explain in detail how the subject acts in order to receive. More precisely, by expanding Marion's usage of Kant, the inner mechanism of the resistance to the given and the reduction can be explained. Thus, my emphasis on Marion's relation to Kant was intentional, as a translation of givenness in Kantian terms shows its compatibility with an active subject whose activity consists in resistance. By showing this, I hope to have addressed the concerns emphasised at the beginning, namely, the question raised in the literature on Marion concerning the relation between givenness and its manifestation for a subject.
